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ABSTRACT
Industrial safety is quite often envisioned by the public and college
graduates in terms of safety slogans and posters. To offer a remedy to
this deficiency in the academic career of college students, particularly
those whose chosen endeavor will be the managerial side of industry, the
course syllabus for industrial safety has been oriented towards emphasiz-
ing the ramifications of accidents in terms of litigation, costs,




The title of this research paper will understandably convey the
connotation that the contents are directed towards a course in the
application of safety procedures. This is far from being the intent.
As opposed to teaching safety methodology, the syllabus is oriented
towards the psychology and philosophy of accident prevention; the rami-
fications of accidents in terms of legal implications and costs; and the
growth of legislation regarding the protection of the employee and the
responsibilities of the employer. This course syllabus is not designed
to qualify one as a Safety Director but rather to aid the management
student, the business student, the engineering student, etc. in under-
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THE INDUSTRIAL SAFETY MOVEMENT
I Prior to the Industrial Revolution.
A. A serious problem of work injuries was not apparent.
1. Most work was carried on in the home or on the farm.
2. Very little machinery existed and what did exist was
not complicated.
3. Families were to a large degree self-sufficient; hence,
industry as we know today, did not exist.
II The Industrial Revolution.
A. Public consciousness of the need for accident control was
first awakened by the deplorable working conditions prevailing during
the early years of the Industrial Revolution.
1. People who had formerly used their homes as the
"workshop" moved to the cities to work in factories.
a. The working conditions soon became crowded and
hazardous
.
(1) Large groups of untrained workers were
exposed to moving gears, blades, etc. for the first time.
(2) Light, ventilation, aisle space, sanitation
were not considered as necessity for proper working conditions.
(3) Employers did not concern themselves about
the degraded conditions since labor was plentiful.
(4) Women and children were employed in large
numbers.
(5) Work days were twelve to fourteen hours
long six days a week.

(6) Employers were not required by law to provide
safety guards on machinery.
b. Victims of accidents had no recourse.
(1) It was possible to sue the employer on the
grounds of negligence, but the burden of proof rested with the
employee who could easily be defeated in court if the employer proved
that the employee had contributed to the cause of the accident.
(2) Employers believed they owed no obligations
to an injured employee.
2. First recognition of an employer's responsibility towards
the employee was the passage of the Employer's Liability Law by Alabama
in 1885.
1
a. The laws were a step forward, but contained several
loopholes which rendered them most ineffective. For example,
(l) Three so-called common law defenses usually
provided the employer with sufficient defense against suits brought
2by the employee. They were entitled,
(a) "Fellow-servant" rule which provided that
an employer was not liable for injury resulting from negligence of
fellow employees,
(b) "Contributory negligence" rule which
provided that an employer was not liable if the injured worker's own
negligence had contributed to the accident.
Roland P. Blake (ed.), Industrial Safety
, p. 13.
2
Rollin H. Simonds, and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Management, p. 17.

(c) "Assumption of Risk" rule which stated
that an employee accepted all "customary" risks of an occupation when
he accepted the job.
3. Other early efforts contributing to the safety movement.
a. Other States began passing laws similar to the
Employers' Liability Law.
b. Soon firms required the services of insurance companies
for protection against possible law suits.
(1) Insurance companies employed engineers to
inspect the insureds' establishments to evaluate accident hazards.
(2) In effect, the insurance company had entered the
field of accident prevention and soon the value of their services was
recognized.
c. Late in the nineteenth century, state legislative
attempts to deal with industrial accidents took the form of factory in-
spection laws.
Ill Workmen's Compensation Laws.
A. The first workmen's compensation law was passed by Maryland in
1902 followed by New York in 1910 and by 1915, thirty states had such
3laws.
1. States initially claimed workmen's compensation laws as
unconstitutional because,
a. Payments were made without regard to who caused the
injury.
b. Payments were made without due process of law.
3
Ibid , p. 18.

2. In 1917, the Supreme Court upheld constitutionality
because of extreme degree of public interest involved.
IV Birth of the National Safety Council (NSC),
A. Its humble beginning started in 1912 when a group of engineers
met in Milwaukee under the auspices of the Association of Iron and Steel
Electrical Engineers to discuss accident costs, accident prevention,
. 4
etc.
1. In 1913 » the same organization met in New York.
a. Name changed to National Council for Industrial
Safety.
b. Safety activities were confined only to industrial
accident problems.
2. In 1915, name of organization changed to National Safety
Council.
a. Scope of activities broaden to include prevention of
all accidents regardless of location, ie, industry, highway, home,
school, etc.
B. The NSC is considered the most effective safety organization in
the world.
1. Annual congress attended by over 12,000 safety and man-
agement personnel.
2. The congress is made up of sectional organizations called
"Conferences" which aid the council staff in developing programs.
a. The "Conferences" constitutents are safety personnel




Blake, op . cit




(5) Pulp and Paper industry.
5V Growth of Professional Safety Organizations.
A. American Society of Safety Engineers.
1. Incorporated in 1915 and operated as a section of NSC.
2. Withdrew in 1947 and became an independent organization with
the aim of developing safety engineering as a profession.
B. American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
1. Originated in 1911 and has done significant work in develop-
ing safety codes for boilers and elevators.
C. International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and
Commissions.
1. Dates back to 1914 and is concerned with the administration
of workmen's compensation laws and the standardization of certain statis-
tical methods.
D. American Standards Association.
1. Sponsored by NSC and functions to establish uniform
standards, national in scope, in recording and measuring work injury
experience.
E. Above examples indicate the diversity with which the safety
movement grew.
1. Professional organizations now rendering safety service
number in the hundreds.
c
VI Growth of Safety within the Federal Government.
5Simonds and Grimaldi, 0£. cit . , p. 22, 23.
a.
Blake, op., cit . , p. 17, 18.

A. Bureau of Mines organized in 1910.
1. One of its major functions was and continues to be a study
of the causes for accidents and illnesses among miners.
B. Bureau of Labor Statistics Organized in 1913.
1. Among other things collects, tabulates, and disseminates
statistical information about industrial injuries and health.
C. Bureau of Standards organized in 1910.
1. Works very closely with the American Standards Association
in formulating safety standards and codes in industrial areas.
D. Division of Labor Standards, Department of Labor.
1. The objectives of the division, created in 1934, are,
a. Formulation of labor standards in labor legislation
and labor law administration.
b. Promote improvement of working conditions.
2. More specifically, this includes,
a. Development of safety codes in cooperation with the
American Standards Association.
b. Furnishing safety and health consulting services.
c. Aiding states to train and improve their safety in-
spection personnel.
7
E. President's Occupational Safety Conference formed in 1948.
1. Consists of committees representing industry, labor, in-
surance, and government personnel.
VII Safety in a Changing World.
A. Social studies have long attributed many of man's ills and short-
comings to a constant cultural lag, to the inability of education to keep
up with the rapid advances of civilization. New inventions, advanced




techniques, bring in their wake new standards and new objectives.
Constant change and diversity continually call for new modes of ad-
justment and for reappraisal of objectives. This constant requirement
for continuing adaptation has become a fertile area for studies in the
social field. Consequently, it is felt that this syllabus should in-
clude discussions concerning both the philosophy and the psychology of
safety prior to relating the economic aspect of safety to management.




THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACCIDENT PREVENTION
I What is the philosophy of industrial safety? The philosophy is a
body of principles underlying the formulation of objectives and the
establishment of a management vehicle, which will lead to accident free
existence in the daily working environment of all employees.
A. Let's examine one of these basic principles, namely "Safety
Consciousness" and its development. To begin with, it is an awareness
of the necessity for forming a mental attitude within the employee's
mind, which acts as a safeguard against his becoming involved in accidents
and consequent injury.
The process is a gradual one built by repetitive training over
a period of time, sometimes extending into years. Gradually, each act
which the employee performs during the course of his work is calculated
toward the accomplishment of his task with a minimum of exposure to
danger. Ultimately, force of habit takes over so that the process
becomes instinctive.
It is readily recognized that the new employee has little
Safety Consciousness, therefore has greater tendencies toward accidents
and injury. However, he is more amenable to safety training at this point
than the older employee.
B. The principles underlying an accident free environment will be
discussed by first noting the ten axioms which constitute the basic
philosophy of accident prevention. Second, where deemed necessary,
further elaborations, evidence, and/or explanations will be presented to
convey the full significance of the principles.
8

II The Ten Axioms.
A. The occurence of an injury invariably results from a completed
sequence of factors - - the last one of these being the accident itself.
The accident in turn is invariably caused or permitted directly by the
unsafe act of a person and/or a mechanical or physical hazard (see section
III).
1. The preciseness with which an accident can occur or fail to
occur is illustrated by the following example which is an actual accident
case.
An underground cable splicer was attaching a clip lead to a
pole ground during the course of electrolysis checks. As he attached the
lead, lighting struck the overhead circuit burning it down. The tran-
sient voltage generated momentarily in the ground wire caused first and
second degree burns on the right hand of the workman. Although not a
serious injury, this accident could have been a fatality had certain
other conditions been just right. However, a small fraction of a
second either way and no injury would have occurred.
B. The unsafe acts of persons are responsible for a majority of
accidents.
1. An example is the air conditioning mechanic who admitted that
he had habitually reached close to a revolving fan in performing some
repair work. Eventually his attention was momentarily distracted and his
hand caught in the moving blades.
"Si.W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention
, p. 13, 14.

C. The person who suffers a disabling injury caused by an unsafe
act, in the average case, has had over 300 narrow escapes from serious
injury as a result of committing the very same unsafe act (see section IV).
1. This doesn't mean that the employee has no injuries within
the scope of "300 narrow escapes" but rather that he was lucky enough to
escape a serious injury for a period of time.
2. The disabling injury is not necessarily the result of the
SAME unsafe act but rather SOME unsafe act.
D. The severity of an injury is largely fortuitous - - the occurrence
of the accident that results in injury is largely preventable.
1. The degree of injury in a given accident is not controlled
to any great extent. However, well trained employees in the art of
rescue and first aid may materially lessen the degree of the resulting
injury. One accident may produce no injury while the next similar accident
may cause a fatality.
E. The four basic motives or reasons for the occurrence of unsafe
acts provide a guide to the selection of appropriate corrective measures
(see section V).
1. Good attitudes, loyality, sincerity, and willingness to
learn are powerful deterrants of accidents. An employee willing and
anxious to learn will have fewer accidents. His mental and physical
skills develop more readily, building his degree of safety consciousness.





personnel adjustment , and
discipline (see section V).
G. Methods of most value in accident prevention are analogous with
the methods required for the control of the quality, cost, and quantity of
10

production (see section VI ).
H. Management has the best opportunity and ability to initiate
the work of accident prevention, therefore it should assume the respon-
sibility.
1. As the result of injuries in an electric shock and burn
case, an employer has spent more than $31>000 in medical costs alone in
endeavoring to bring the employee back to maximun possible recovery.
Today, several years later, the employee is more than 50$ disabled and
his earning power cut more than 50$.
2. To management today, its employees are by far its most
valuable asset. Investment of a very few dollars in safety training per
employee can easily save several times the training cost. An annual cost
of $100,000 for a group of 2500 employees can easily prevent accidents
costing several times greater.
I. The supervisor or foreman is the key man in industrial accident
prevention. His application of the act of supervision to the control of
worker performance is the factor of greatest influence in successful
accident prevention. It can be expressed and taught as a simple seven
step formula (see section VII ).
1. Any accident prevention program must have as its broad base
the cooperation of the foreman. He is the man who if he applies himself
to the study of his men, will know, for example, when the employee's
little girl is seriously ill. He is the supervisor with sufficient
wisdom to detect and become sensitive to changes in the employee's
emotions, which may throw an employee's ordinarily careful work completely
off balance and produce an accident.
2. Several years ago, an employee for a utility company was
killed while removing the grounding wire from a high voltage transmission
11

tower. There is a very definite sequence for removing ground wires.
This particular employee had attempted to remove the ground wire in
REVERSE sequence.
During the investigation, the foreman testified he had
noticed that the employee was not "acting his usual self" and that
instead of eating lunch, the employee had chosen to use the time in
placing a telephone call. It was later learned that the employee had
called his wife to check on the condition of his child who was seriously
ill with pneumonia.
J. The humanitarian incentive for preventing accident injury is
supplemented by two powerful economic factors: (l) the safe establish-
ment is efficient productively and the unsafe establishment is ineffici-
ent; (2) the direct employer cost of industrial injuries for compen-
sation claims and for medical treatment is but one fifth of the total
cost which the employer must pay (see section VIII ).
Ill The Accident Sequence.
2
A. The Five Factors in the Accident Sequence are,
1. Ancestory and social environment.
2. Fault of person.
3. Unsafe act and/or mechanical or physical hazard.
4. Accident.
5. Injury.
The occurrence of a preventable injury is the culmination of the above





logical order. One is dependent on another and one follows because of
another, thus constituting a sequence that may be compared with a row of
dominoes placed on end and in such alignment that the fall of the first
domino precipitates the fall of the entire row. The accident is merely
one factor in the sequence. If the series is interrupted by the elimin-
ation of one of the above listed factors, the injury cannot occur.
B. Practical application of the five factors.
1. Knowledge of the factors in the accident sequence guides and
assists in selecting a point of attack in prevention work.
2. The factors in the accident sequence constitute an index
of the kind of information the accident preventionist must deal with if
he is to perform his work efficiently.
IV The Foundation of a Major Injury.
A. A study of over 5000 accident cases revealed that for every
mishap resulting in an injury, there are many other similar accidents
that cause no injuries.
1. More specifically, it was determined that in a unit
group of 330 accidents of the same kind and involving the same person,
300 of the accidents result in no injuries, 29 in minor injuries, and
31 in a major lost time injury. Of course, these are average figures.
B. The 300-29-1 ratio, an aid in accident prevention.
1. Viewed as an aid in accident prevention, the ratio is
significant because it vividly emphasizes preventive opportunities.




A. The method whereby unsafe acts are to be corrected is most
effective when it suits the reason for the occurrence of an unsafe act.
1. The reasons for unsafe acts may be placed under four
general headings,
a. Improper attitude.
b. Lack of knowledge or skill.
c. Physical unsuitability.
d. Improper mechanical or physical environment.
For example, employees were continually violating company safe practice
rules relative to washing before eating luncheon. All efforts in the
way of instruction, supervision, and education had failed to produce
results. When the reason for the unsafe act was found, it developed
that the washrooms were uncomfortably drafty and that the water was
cold. In short, the unsafe act was committed largely because it was
inconvenient and uncomfortable to follow the safe practice.
2. The important points to be made are,
a. Definite causative factors lie directly behind the
occurrence of unsafe acts.
b. The causative factors are few in number and normally
easily indentifiable.
c. The causative factors are extremely valuable as
direct clues to the selection of corrective action.







accident prevention may be grouped into four classifications,
1. Engineering revision - Guarding, redesign, relocation, etc.
2. Persuasion and appeal - Instruction and reinstruction in
safe practices.
3. Personnel adjustment - Reassignment of workers.
4. Discipline - Mild reproval, admonition, penalties, etc.
VI Analogy between Methods of Controlling Accidents Causes and Production
Faults.
A. The control of quality and quantity of product and of the
frequency and severity of accident occurrences, have much in common.
1. In many cases, the faulty practice involved and the reason
for existance of the fault, sponsors both accident occurrence and unsatis -
factory production.
2. In many cases, the best method to correct an unsafe practice
is identical with managerial and supervisory methods which would be used
if the practice were not unsafe but was one that resulted in high cost
production.
VII Formula for Supervision.
A. Management has long recognized the vital status of its key
people, namely the supervisors and foremen, for,
1. It is the immediate supervisor who has direct control of
worker performance and the maintenance of environmental conditions in so
far as these affect the quality and volume of production and the safety





not being taught as an art that is subject to specific definitions and
rules of application.
a. Instead, "supervision' 1 is described, preached,
stated as a necessary element, philosophize, etc., but the question of
"how" usually remains unanswered. What was needed was a simple formula -
one that could be applied to any and all supervisory situations. Such
a development known as "The Scientific Method Applied to Problem Solving','
sets forth a seven step problem solving procedure. Although the steps,
as noted below, may not be exactly applicable to every situation, the
author's logical systematic approach, and the questions posed to ensure
each factor is adequately researched, leaves no doubt that every para-
meter of the problem should be explored.
STEP I WHAT ARE THE FACTS?
Where is the evidence?
Have I examined all sides of the issue?
Am I dealing with facts or assumptions?
Do I have the right answers to WHAT? WHY? WHERE? WHEN? WHO?
HOW?
Is this a problem subject to qualitative and/or to quantitative
measurement?
STEP II REDEFINE THE PROBLEM !
What is the immediate or critical incident?
What is the real deep seated, underlying cause?
Can we treat the problem at the source?
Vm, Howard Church, "The Scientific Method Applied to Problem Solving,"
(Monterey, Calif ., U.S. Naval Post Graduate School), mimeographed.
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STEP III WHAT MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES , LAWS OR CRITERIA APPLY TO
THIS CASE?
Which criteria have been violated?
What list of criteria and management policy could prevent
the recurrence of this problem? What other criteria could
one recommend that would anticipate and help prevent other
management problems in this organization or in this case
study?
STEP IV WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION?
Higher authority may need several alternatives. Which ones
have maximized results while having the least number of
undesirable effects or consequences?
STEP V WHAT HUMAN FACTORS ARE INVOLVED THAT CAN HAVE FAR REACHING
CONSEQUENCES ON MORALE AND EFFICIENCY?
Have we analyzed the "Zone of Acceptance" of every group
or individual concerned in terms of proposed recommendations?
STEP VI WHAT WILL BE THE ULTIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION
OR COURSE OF ACTION RECOMMENDED?
Let's have a trial runl
Let's be willing to change and start over if a plan is
tried and does not work!
STEP VII TAKE ACTION . BUT IF WE WANT RESULTS , WE MUST BUILD
SUPPORT AND ACCEPTANCE . THERE MUST BE BASIC UNDERSTANDING
OF THE DESIRABILITY OR NEED FOR SUCH ACTION*
'
Then, let's follow through to see that the desired results
are obtained
I
VIII Costs of accidents.
A. To some executives, the costs of accidents are looked upon only in
terms of the compensation paid the employee. Unfortunately, this is non-
recognition of the fact that accident prevention is an essential element of
sound business management.
1. Annual estimates of industrial accidents are stated in terms of
millions of dollars and are usually based upon the loss time of the injured
17

and medical expense. These expenses are considered the employer's loss
inasmuch as the employee is partially compensated.
a. The remaining additional cost has been found by research
7to be four times as great .
b. Stated another way, compensation and medical payments
constitute only one-fifth of the total employer accident cost.
B. Examples of Hidden Cost.
1. The calculations from which the above 4 to 1 ratio was derived
were based on examples of cost such as follows. The list is not meant to be
complete but only indicative.
a. Cost of lost time of injured employee.
b. Cost of lost time by other employees who stop work for
reasons of curiosity, sympathy, etc.
c. Cost of time lost by foremen, supervisors, and other man-
agement levels for purposes of assisting, investigating, arranging for re-
placement, preparing accident reports, etc.
d. Cost of damage done to machinery.
e. Production loss.
C. Development of Cost Centers.
1. Cost centers are normally employed to measure production
efficiency of one department or a homogenous unit of work processes.
a. This action only results in partially reflecting the cost
of production.
b. The omission is cost of accidents.







a. For purposes of standardization, develop an index of
"most likely" types of accidents.
b. Intergrate both production and accident costs to reflect
the "true" efficiency.
3. Cost centers perform a two-fold purpose.
a. It permits top management to know who is out of line
cost-wise.
b. It stimulates a supervisor to take an entrepreneur
attitude toward his area of control.
IX As noted previously, philosophy is not the only social science supporting
and guiding the selection and application of accident-preventive methods.
Psychology also plays an equal part. Whereas philosophy includes recognition
of fact, the finding of reasons or causes, and drawing conclusions, psychology
seeks to explain the human behavior associated with each step of the accident





THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCIDENT PREVENTION
I Psychology and the Safety Engineer.
A. Opportunity exists for professional psychology to be introduced
much more into the field of practical accident prevention. Evidence
continually accumulates indicating the need for accident control measures
based on better knowledge of human behavior. The successful accident
preventionist, although probably untrained and inexperienced from a trained
psychologist's viewpoint, continually applies psychological methods in his
work.
1. The safety engineer endeavors to sell safe methods realizing
that unsafe actions of persons predominate in accident causation.
2. The safety engineer endeavors, when simple and direct remedies
fail, to find out why the unsafe action persists.
B. Suggestions as to what the psychological profession might do to assist
in accident prevention are given in the following paper.
It is an understatement of considerable depth to say that the
practical application of psychology to industrial problems lacks full
appreciation by industry. Safety engineers, however, agree that
psychology has a place of considerable importance in accident pre-
vention. They are not psychologists but their profession demands that
they deal with persons. Clearly this is required because the great
majority of accidents are caused by the unsafe acts of persons. With-
out some knowledge of psychology they are limited in this phase of
their work to finding what particular unsafe acts require correction,
and then, more or less arbitrarily, to depending on engineering,
supervisory control, enforcement, and education for the remedy.
The psychologist could be of tremendous assistance in corrective
or preventive action if he would step into the picture and suggest
some way whereby the safety engineer may determine why persons act
unsafely and what is practical to do about it. An approach of this
nature might well lead eventually to the more general acceptance by
management of the idea that an industrial psychologist should be in-
cluded as a member of the plant staff just as a physician is already
so included.
TI. W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention, p. 171.
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Pending the time when the psychologist teams up with the safety-
engineer and plies his profession more frequently in the average
industrial establishment, there is a way he can create a much wider
and quicker acceptance of industrial psychology as a practical aid
in safe and efficient production.
This lies in the conversion of the applicable principles of
psychology to lay language. For ready understanding by the engineer-
ing fraternity the factors involved might be set up somewhat as
shown by the items in columns A, B, and C, as in the accompanying
table.










1. Inexperienced. 1. Impulsive, in-
tolerant, advent-
urous.
2. Destroys, cheats, mis-
adjusts safety devices.
2o Lacks full appreciation
of danger.
2. Feeling of in-
security or an-
xiety.
3. Quarrels with others. 3. Fatigued, physically
unsuited, or below par.
3. Inconsiderate, des-
tructive, jealous.
4. Fails to warn others. 4. Inattentive, absent-
minded.
4. Not recognized or
appreciated.








The items in column A represent the several kinds of unsafe action that
concern the safety engineer. He is on sure ground thus far. He knows and
can determine what persons do unsafely.
Column B represents the engineer's attempt to set up the probable
and immediate causes or reasons why unsafe personal action is taken.
Here the safety engineer gets a bit beyond his element. He has no set
of guiding rules. He uses his judgment and what he happens to know of
human nature.
When it comes to the items in column C, the engineer is in even
deeper water. These items are intended to represent the underlying
causative factors. In other words, they are what the engineer believes to
be the reasons why the immediate causes (column B) exist and ultimately
why the latter, in turn, cause or permit unsafe practice.
As can be seen, the three columns constitute a sequence of cause and
21

effect items. Those in B and C are probably far from correct or all-
inclusive. Practical experience however has shown that many of them
fit individual cases nicely. In any event it is not the exact content
but rather the frame-work that is advocated herein.
C. The following is an example of an actual accident which had as
a basis an underlying causative factor that was not readily apparent
until after considerable investigation.
1. Several years ago an electric power line installation
crew was setting a pole. A manually operated type of A-frame, with the
middle stiff leg assembled in three sections, was being used. In
assembling the middle stiff leg, the truck driver inserted the pin
through the middle section of the leg and behind the end of the bottom
section rather than through the hole in the bottom section. The middle
leg was attached to the truck bed and the tension released on the winch
line. The pin having been inserted improperly allowed the A-frame to
fall striking a man on the head and breaking his neck. The employee
survived but at a great deal of cost to both he and the firm.
2. The superficial cause of the accident was simple -
improper insertion of the pin. The underlying causative factor was
revealed only after extensive probing. The night before the accident,
the truck driver's wife had gone horse-back riding with a male companion
and did not return until the early hours of the morning. Upon her
return, a very unpleasant situation followed. As a result, the man
was emotionally upset.
II "Carelessness, Recklessness, and Bad Luck" - Their Use and Abuse.
A. Individuals have been prone to ascribe accidents to one of
these non-descriptive terms, but are these the real causes or are they
22

merely apparent causes? Accidents do not just happen.
1. Every accident has one or more reasons.
2. The causes may be external to the individual or they
may be within him.
3. Or, tney may arise from both external and internal sources.
B. The above terms, and other similar ones are usually emphasized
as the most important of the causes which lie within the individual.
However, these words explain little and in fact, misrepresent the causes
2
of accidents. For example.
1. Consider the worker at a grinding wheel who injured his
eye because he did not wear goggles which were given to him. One would
be inclined to say that he was careless, but was he? Assuming normality,
he would care very much for his eyes. Then what caused the accident?
It may have been a desire to show off - - to be a tough guy who didn't
need goggles.
2. Or, what about the man working at a soldering bench who
burns himself often because he has arranged his work so that his arm
must pass over heated objects. It might be said that he is careless,
but the inner reason is probably that he never thought well enough to
set up his work in an orderly manner.
C. It becomes readily apparent that such adjectives as "careless"
or "reckless" as given cause of accidents, neither describes, defines,
nor implies a phenomenon of human behavior which would be useful in
determining a correction for the cause of accidents.
1. Instead, the use of such non-descriptive words to account
for reasons of an accident is analogous to tossing a blanket over the
2




a. Obscures the truth and permits the loss of accident
facts.
b. Permits the assumption to arise that accident
causation has been determined.
2. The truth is that in every case where an accident cause
lies within the individual and is ascribed to one of the aforementioned
words, it is really thought 1essne s
s
which is normally responsible. The
ascription of accident occurrences to thoughtlessness means that correct-
ive action is feasible by:
a. Improving habits through,
(1) Defining the desirable habits to be acquired.
(2) Practicing the desirable habit at every
opportunity.
desirable habit.
(3) Creating opportunities for practicing the
(4) Allowing no exception to occur.
b. Training.
c. Increasing the power of concentration. Factors
contributing to reduced powers of concentration are:
(1) Too many interests.
(2) Lack of interest within job.
(3) Worry and fear.
(4) Negative factors within organizational climate,
(a) Excessive noise, poor interrelationship





3. The word thoughtlessness has another application de-
serving of consideration and more than often overlooked by the layman.
This application is related to the highly trained, highly skilled,
sincere, well oriented employee who becomes involved in an accident.
This is especially frequent in vehicle accidents and often involves
top executives. In the case of vehicle accidents, their minds are
busy working on many problems and are paying little or no attention to
their driving. This explains the often repeated comment that a moron
makes a better driver than a bank president. He has his mind on only
one problem, namely, his driving. This helps to explain why the highly
skilled employee of many years experience sometimes becomes an unsafe
workman.
Ill Accident - Repeater and Accident - Proneness.
A. An early and still existing view in some safety literature
is that there is a real difference between an accident repeater and
a person who is prone to have accidents, or as described by one author,
accident-proneness implies a predisposition to or propensity for
accidents.
1. More recently accident proneness has been used as an
explanatory term for an individual's repetitious accident experience.
This newer use of the term is as misleading as such words just previously
described.
a. Being used as a cause of accidents, "accident-
proneness" tends to cloud the accident facts.
2. If a person continually has accidents, the reasons will
4




probably be related to either,
a. Physical or mental make-up.
b. Or to the environment in which he works.
Consequently, the use of the term "accident proneness" is, in general,
5
subject to objection.
B. The better term to use in indentifying personnel who experience
recurring accidents is "accident repeater" because,
1. It describes only the relative status of a individual's
accident record.
2. It avoids the connotation that a person possesses an
incurable causative deficiency.
3. It requires that a search be instituted to locate the
"real" reason.
4. It also indicates a controllable situation. For example,
an automotive mechanic climaxed a series of accidents in which he had
been involved by running two fingers through a set of gears. Due to the
increasing frequency and severity of his accidents, two members of manage-
ment, with the knowledge of the foreman, reviewed with the employee his
accident record pointing out the dangers of his increasing accident
rate. The result of this meeting was a promise on the part of the
employee to improve. That was fifteen years ago. He has never had an
accident since. He is now foreman and the men he supervises do not have
5Simonds and Grimaldi, ojd. cit






C. A report based on a study of a consecutive series of 35 , 000
accident cases indicates that the accident repeater is not a sign-
7ificant factor in the safety problem. The study reported that:
1. Persons who consistently experienced injuries annually
over a period of three years accounted for only a small
percentage of all the accidents studies (0.5 per cent).
2. Most of the accidents (74 per cent) were due to "relatively
infrequent solitary experiences" of a significantly large
group of persons (86 per cent). An interesting observation
was made that the percentage distributions were the same
for the occupational as well as nonoccupational accident
groupings and did not vary for most of the years over a
20 year period.
3. Accidents, in the groups studied, occurred most frequently
to persons in the age group of 20-24 at a rate two and one-
half times greater than that for persons aged 40-44 , four
times greater than at the age of 50-54, and nine times
greater than at 60-64. This prevailed similarly in both
the occupational and nonoccupational groups. It would
appear that the susceptibility to having accidents dis-
appears with increasing age. Schulzinger did not discuss
the comparative severity of accidents suffered by the
younger group as opposed to the older groups. But it
might be assumed that the older the person, the more
severe the effects of a similar accident would be and
that this would be most evident for the age groups past
50 years.
IV Questionable Causes of Accidents.
A. Reaction Time . It may appear quite logical to hypothesize
that reaction time would have a significant influence on a person's
ability to avoid accidents. The evidence is somewhat disputable, how-
ever, there appears to be a prevailing opinion that reaction time has
no important relationship to accident causation.
B. Relationship between Perception and Muscular Responses, and
7
Ibid, p. 401, citing M.S. Schulzinger, "Accident Proneness','
Industrial Medicine and Surgery , Vol. XXIII (April, 1954), p. 151-52.
o
Ibid, p. 402, citing E. Farmer and E.G. Chambers, A Study of
Personal Qualities in Accident Proneness and Proficiency
,
Report No. 55,
(London: Industrial Health Research Board, 1929
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accidents . It was found that persons who tend to react more quickly
than they perceive are more likely to have accidents than are those who
9perceive faster than they react.
C. Relationship between Intelligence and Accident Experience .
There have been contradicting studies as to whether or not a correlation
exists between accident repetition and level of intelligence. This dis-
agreement has been explained by the realization that a definite minimum
intelligence is required to avoid accidents and that the minimum critical
intelligence may be a function of the complexities associated with the
job. It appears doubtful if any relationship exists between intelligence
and accident experience above the minimum level considered necessary to
do the job. ^ence, mental ability tests might be used to identify
employees with extremely low abilities.
D. Age . Studies have indicated a declining accident rate as the
age increases. This is probably attributable to increase in experience
and a probable decrease in irresponsibility , impulsiveness, etc.
V Learning.
A. Learning underlies most of what makes for differences and
similarities among people. Through learning, people developed certain
9
Ibid, p. 403, citing C±A. Drake, Personnel Selection by Standard
Job Tests (New Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1942).
10T,.,Ibid .
Ibid, p. 404, citing M.S. Schulzinger, "Accident Proneness,"
Industrial Medicine and Surgery . Vol, XXIII (April, 1954), p. 151-52.
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kinds of habitual patterns of behavior, ways of reacting to emotion,
and attitudes which are brought with the employee to industry. The
question of learning and the laws which affect it are vital tools for
the safety engineer.
The safety engineer must also keep in mind that if the workers
are going to learn safe procedures, they must be so motivated. It is
not safe to assume that because management sees the value of safe pro-
cedures the worker will also. Management may be motivated to start a
safety program because of insurance reduction costs, reduction of
waste, and an increase in production. Workers will not necessarly
desire it for the same reasons. In selling a safety program to employees,
one must capitalize on things which will motivate them.
B. The motivation plus the necessity for changing certain under-
sirable habitual patterns of behavior is developed through the applicat-
12ion of the basic laws of learning, These laws are as follows:
1. Law of Use.
a. Safety lessons must be stressed over and over to
the point that safe habit patterns become almost automatic in work
metnods. This requires not only training sessions but "follow-up"
on the job by the foreman.
2. Law of Disuse.
a. This is the reciprocal of the law of use.
b. In terms of the psychologist, this law states
that if a connection between a stimulus pattern and a response is not
exercised during a period of time, the strength of the connection
decreases.
12
Stack and Elkow, op . cit . , p. 51.
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c. In terms of the laymen, if safety education is hap-
hazard without any planned continuing program, the desired consequences
of Rule Qa.e will never materialize.
3. Law of Effect
.
a. This law states that individuals tend to repeat
those responses that are satisfying.
b. This means that through the establishment of a reward
system, eg, recognition by presenting safety awards, paying bonuses,
etc, the latter becomes the vehicle by which the employees will try to
duplicate the behavior which gave them the initial reward.
c. Publicity should be given to the reward system and
the reward should closely follow the behavior being rewarded.
4. Law of Primacy.
a. This law states that first experiences are more
likely to be retained than latter experiences.
b. The worker's initial contact with safety procedures
should be one of major importance.
c. Don't give a new employee a book of rules and say
"learn them," creating an air that safety is not really important.
d. The worker must get the impression that not only are
the rules important but so is the entire program. This will help en-
sure the positive response desired.
e. There should be "follow-through" by the foreman to
make certain that the employee has no opportunity to work other than
by the safe method.
f
.
His training must be right from the very beginning.
5. Law of Recency.
30

a. This law states that recent experiences are more
likely to be retained than remote ones. Or, the more recent the ex-
ercise of a connection between stimulus pattern and response, the
stronger the connection will be.
b. This principle is exercised by devising means which
give workers constant contact with applicable safety procedures through
activities such as contests, reviews of safety regulations, and committee
work.
6. Law of Vividness.
a. This law states that a vivid experience is more
likely to be retained than one that is not vivid.
b. This principle requires dramatization of the safety
program, eg, eye-catching posters, slogans, etc. Those learning
experiences made the most vivid will be retained the longest.
c. This law in effect states "Let's dress up the
safety program in the same way that advertisers dress up their commercials
13
to catch the public's attention."
VI Men, machines, and materials are three of the basic components of
industry. They all can be employed for safety. However, there is one
distinction. Machine and materials can be controlled but the human
factor must be guided in the interests of accident prevention. This
"guidance" is not a mission singularly handled by the safety director.
The manifested interest must commence with the top echelon and terminate
with the employee, with the foremen playing a key role of providing the
13




feedback necessary for the change of behavior, introduced by the safety
director, to become effective. Only after realization that "Safety is





THE GROWTH OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
I The Evolution of Work Injury Compensation.
A. Common Law Rules.
1. To provide a reasonably safe work place.
2. To provide reasonably safe tools and equipment.
3. To use reasonable care in selecting employees.
4. To enforce reasonable safety rules.
5. To provide reasonable instruction regarding the dangers
of the employment.
B. Ineffectiveness of Common Law Rules.
1. These laws were the first legal vehicle by which employees
could seek financial compensation from employers for reasons of personal
injury. However,, there were disadvantages which almost completely
nullified the efforts of the employees,
a. To receive compensation, the laws required that the
employee bring a personal injury suit against his employer. This pro-
cedure was not conducive to continuing compatible relationships between
the employer and the employee.
b. The courts of the latter half of the nineteenth
century interpreted the rules strictly and the employee rarely recovered
damages.
c. The employers effectively employed the use of the
"Common Law" defenses (noted in Chapter i) against the personal injury
suits of employees.
Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 5th
Edition p. 11-2^7 ™~~—— — —
33

Statistics indicate that approximately AOfo of the industrial
accidents were attritubable to deficiencies on both the part of the
employee and the employer. It has been estimated that an additional
30$ of accidents was due solely to the fault of the employee. There-
fore, because of the "Common Law" defenses, approximately lOfo of all
disabilities were not compensated under the Common Law System.
C. Employers' Liability Laws.
1. These laws were a second attempt to give the employee a
legal vehicle by which he could received compensation for injuries
occurring at his place of employment.
2. The Employers' Liability Laws' primary gain was the
dilution of the effectiveness of the employers' use of the Common Law
defenses.
3. Although the employee had made a step forward, he was still
in the position of having to initiate the action to recover damages, ie,
a. The injured worker still had to bring a lawsuit for
damages against his employer, assuming that private negotiations did not
result in a satisfactory settlement.
D. Workmen's Compensation Laws.
1. The first workmen's compensation act was a German law
enacted in 1884, which was a self-supporting insurance plan under
3government supervision.
2. As noted in Chapter I, the first workmen's compensation







followed by a Federal Government compensation law in 1908. By 1915,
thirty states had some type of compensation law.
3. These early laws encountered the problem of constitution-
ality primarily on the grounds of,
a. Violating the 14th Amendment to the Constitution,
which prohibits taking a person's property without due process of law.
4. To by-pass the rulings of courts, various state legislative
bodies passed elective laws which,
a. Granted both the employer and the employee the right
to decide whether or not each wished to come under the act.
b. Presumed the employer or employee to come under
the act unless a petition to the contrary was filed prior to the
occurrence of an injury.
5. Upon the United States Supreme Court declaration that
workmen's compensation laws were within the meaning of the Constitution,
states began passing compulsory laws for certain areas of employment
with penalities imposed for non-compliance. To date, compensation
4laws have been enacted in all fifty states, in two federal jurisdict-
ions, in Puerto Rico, and in the District of Columbia, which brings to a
total a sum of fifty-four different compensation systems used in the
United States.
II The Compensation Principle.
A. With the advent of the Supreme Court ruling,
1. The employer surrendered his right to insist on proof
of negligence, and
4




2. Labor surrendered its right to sue for unlimited damages.
Consequently, compensation laws eliminated liability based solely on proof
of the employer's negligence and substituted for it a system of liability
regardless of the employer's fault. Employers are held liable not on the
basis of fault or negligence but on the basis of social policy .
B. The principle underlying compensation law is that liability
for industrial accidents is one of the costs of operating a business
therefore, such costs should be transferred from the worker and the
5
employer to the consumer.
Ill Summary of Compensation Laws
A. State Laws.
As previously noted, to circumvent the constitutional ob-
jection to compensation laws prior to the 1917 Supreme Court ruling,
many state laws were made in whole or in part, elective. Although
obsolete this provision of "electiveness" still remains in nearly one
half of all state compensation laws. Thus, when an employee or employer
fail to elect coverage and the law does not presume it, a worker may
not be protected by the compensation act. For this reason and because
of other exemptions and exceptions, wide variations exists from state
to state in covered employment as a percentage of eligible employment,
6
1. At one extreme, compensation laws of six states reach
or more of the potentially eligible employees.
2. At the other end of the scale, there are seven states
Accident Prevention Manual „ op. cit.
,
p. 11-3.
Cheit, op . cit . , p. 16.
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whose laws reach less than 6O/0 of the potentially eligible employees.
3. Over half of the states have laws which reach more than
70$ of the potentially eligible employees.
Although each of the fifty-four compensation laws employ fairly
similar principles in their approach to establishing liability and
eligibility for benefits , there is considerable difference from juris-
diction to jurisdiction as to administration , benefits paid, etc.
Some of these differences are as follows:
1. Although most injuries are covered, many occupational
diseases are not. About two-thirds of the jurisdictions provide
blanket coverage of all diseases. The other third enumerate specific
diseases that shall be compensated. There are two states which do not
compensate for occupational diseases.
2. Medical benefits are paid in full for both accidental
injuries and occupational diseases in about two-thirds of the juris-
dictions. The remaining jurisdictions either provide a duration or
dollar limit.
3. Wide ranges exists in weekly benefits for permanent
disability (from $28 in Idaho and Montana to $150 in Arizona).
a. Some jurisdictional benefits are payable for life,
but most are limited.
4. There is great divergence in surviors' benefits in
cases of occupational death.
5» In some states, the administering agency is merely an ad-
judicating agency, whereas in others, the agency plays an active role in
7




6. All states cover state and local public employees com-
pletely or partially, however, this coverage in some states is on an
elective basis where as in other states the coverage is compulsory.
7. There is a great divergence among the jurisdictional laws
as to what type of employment is covered. In one-fourth of the states,
compensation laws apply mainly to listed "hazardous" or extra hazardous"
employments.
a. In many states, employers of fewer than a stipulated
number of employees are exempt from compensation law. However, most
of these states permit voluntary acceptance.
b. In other states, numerical exemptions do not apply
to certain employments.
/ \ 9
B. Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA).
This law plus the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act
cover 3.3 million workers under the Federal compensation program.
Both are administered by the Bureau of Employees' Compensation, Dep-
artment of Labor. As noted previously, the FECA was the first compensat-
ion protection given Federal employees and the second compensation law
enacted in the United States. After several revisions, the FECA has
become one of the most liberal compensation laws.
1. The FECA covers both injury and disease related disabilities,
2. Medical payments are unlimited.
3. The FECA covers all rehabilitation costs in, addition
to regular compensation benefits.
8




Cheit, 0£. cit . p. 18.
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4. Disabled workers receive two-thirds of the weekly wage
up to $121.15 per week, or three-fourths where there are dependents.
5. There is no duration or total dollar limits on indemnity-
payments to the totally disabled.
6. Benefits to the partially disabled are paid to according
to a schedule of injuries.
7. Death benefits ranged from Ajfo to 75$, according to depen-
dents, and are payable for the period of widowhood and minor dependency
without total dollar limits. Both administrative and benefit cost of
FECA are financed by Congressional appropriations.
C. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
This law, which covers approximately one million workers,
grew out of a problem posed by the longshoremen's status under maritime
law. In accordance with a nineteenth century precedent, longshoremen
were subject to maritime laws and were not eligible for state compens-
ation benefits. This decision was based on the theory that whatever
work is done to aid a ship in the performance of its mission, including
loading or unloading freight and passengers, this work is a maritime
service and thereby an area which does not come under state compensation
laws. After several unsuccessful attempts to bring the workmen under
a compensation law, Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act in 1927.
1. The law covers both injury and disease related dis-
abilities.
2. The law is not quite as liberal as the FECA although it






a. Medical benefits are unlimited with limited re-
habilitation costs.
b. Indemnity benefits provide a maximum dollar benefit
of $70 per week.
c. Permanent partial disability is limited to $24,000.
d. There is no limit on permanent disability.
e. Death benefits range from 35$ to 66 2/3$ according
to dependency and are payable for the duration of widowhood and depend-
ency. Since private employment is involved, liability is privately
insured. However, administrative costs are financed by Congressional
appropriation.
C. Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA). 11
This law, which was first enacted in 1906, declared unconstitut-
ional in 1908, and re-enacted once again one month after the FECA,
covers approximately 1.1 million interstate railroad employees. The
law was passed in response to deplorable working conditions which
surrounded the railroad industry. The accident and/or death rate was,
1. One out of every 399 employees was killed (estimation).
2. For operating employees, the death rate was one in every
137.
3. The injury rate was one in 26.
The FELA, although amended twice, and has been subjected to
considerable criticism, is still the basis for work injury compensation
of interstate railroad employees. The FELA, does not provide for




1. The employer is responsible for damages to his employees
for work related injuries, but only for those injuries which occur as
a result of the employer's negligence.
a. The employer may not defend a suit on the grounds of
fellow-employee ' s negligence.
b. The employer may not use the defense that employees
assume normal risks with their employment (This common law defense was
modified to its present condition in 1939).
2. Contributory negligence is a relevant issue.
a. Damage awards can be reduced to the extent that
employee negligence can be proven.
3. Courts resolve the rights of the employer and employee
for disagreements involving work-connected injuries.
The use of negligence as a basis for occupational disability
compensation has been under continuous criticism. Strange as it may
seem, the proposals for a workmen's compensation system have been
rejected by the railroad workers themselves who contend that workmen's
compensation would reduce their economic security.
12
D. The Jones Act and Admiralty Law.
These two laws cover an estimated 87? 000 seamen (defined as
the "master and crew of any vessel in navigable waters") which re-
presents the smallest occupational group with separate legal status for
occupational disability compensation. The legal intricacies are far
more complex since the employees are not only covered by two separate
legal systems, admiralty and tort law; in addition benefits are also
available under other statutes. This situation has led the National
Association of Compensation Claimants' attorneys to refer to seamen
12
Ibid, p. 23. . .

13
as "the most fortunate of all injured workers."
14
E. State Employers' Liability and Tort Law.
As previously noted, due to exclusions, exemptions, eligibility
requirements etc. workmen's compensation coverage for all employees is
far from complete. For these employees who are not covered, their only
redress in cases of disagreement is the State Employers' Liability and
Tort Laws. This means that,
1. The employee must file suit against his employer.
2. The common law defenses may be used against the employee.
Consequently, the delays, costs, etc. are only slightly smaller than
when the procedure of undertaking a lawsuit for obtaining injury com-
pensation was condemned a half century ago.
IV Methods of Complying with Compensation Laws.
A. Workmen's Compensation laws make the employer liable to his
employee and requires that he take steps to guarantee payment of
stipulated benefits. Methods of compliance are as follows;
1. Purchase of insurance from private companies.
2. Self-insurance.
a. Self insurance is permitted in most states for
employers able to meet specified requirements.
b. Generally, only very large companies can self-insure












a. There are seven states whose laws provide that
insurance must be procured through a state fund.
1
6
V Little Known Elements of Workmen's Compensation Laws.
A. Subcontractors' Employees.
1. Some states provide that a general contractor is res-
ponsible for compensation to employees of subcontractors .
2. The contractor is excused from this responsibility only if
the subcontractors themselves have provided for their compensation
obligations.
3. Therefore, obtaining evidence of workmen's compensation
insurance from sub-contractors is a prerequisite.
B. Employer's Liability.
As noted previously, many employees are not covered by
compensation laws and have only the common law as a means of recovery
for personal injury. Therefore, the employers workmen's compensation
policy should include liability coverage.
1. It protects employers against suits by third parties who
may have a right of action against the insured.
2. Liability coverage could be a necessity in those states
having an elective compensation law. For example, if an employer
elected to accept the law, and a few employees did not, the employer
would be subject to common law action if an injury occurred to an
employee who had not accepted the law.
3. Same principle applies in states making numerical
exemptions to the compensation law.
15
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1. In most states, a minor , whether employed legally or
illegally, is protected by workmen's compensation laws.
2. In cases of illegal employment, some states provide pen-
alities of double compensation or afford the minor the right to sue
for damages.
D. Extraterritorial Accidents.
1. Most of the compensation laws apply to injuries sustained
outside their respective states while employees are engaged in temporary
work.
2. Some states take jurisdiction of an injury occurring within
its boundaries even though the employee's contact of hire was made in
another state.
3. Due to the lack of uniformity in extraterritorial
accidents, employers, whose employees work in different states, should
provide coverage for all eventualities
E. Second Injury Funds.
1. Suppose an employee who has lost a member of his body,
loses another and becomes permanently and totally disabled. He then
becomes eligible for full payment for his combined disabilities.
2. If total cost of such compensation were imposed upon
the last employer, handicapped persons might be refused employnent.
3. To meet this problem, almost every state has statutory
provisions for a second injury fund. These are financially supported
by assessments levied on insurance companies, self-insurers, and in
a few states, by appropriations out of general revenues.
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4. Continuing the above example, the second member of his
body is compensated by the employer and the difference between benefits
for the combined disabilities and the benefits for the last injury is
paid out of the second-injury fund.
F. Third Party Liability
1. An employee whose injury falls within the workmen's
compensation statutes must accept the benefits provided in the law
and cannot sue his company. However, there is nothing to prevent the
employee from suing a third party whose negligence was the cause of
the accident.
2. In practically every state, the right of an employee
to sue a third party who is not connected with the employment, is
stipulated in workmen's compensation statutes. However, the laws
usually place some limit on the employee's rights to recover so that he
cannot collect from both his employer and the third party.
a. In some states, the employer takes over the
employee's right against third parties. Provision is then made for the
employer to pay the employee any excess over the compensation paid to
the latter.
b. In other states, an employee may proceed directly
against the third party. If he recovers, the employee must reimburse
the employer or insurance company for compensation benefits he has
already received.
3. Defendants in third party suits have one defense known as
the "Law of Contributory Negligence." If the injured employee has
contributed in any degree to his own accident, this constitutes a
complete defense for the defendant. However, this defense is receiving
45

less and less consideration by the courts because
,
a. The jurors' lack of understanding the "Law of
Contributory Negligence."
b. The injured' s presence in the court room, who for
example, may have lost a member of his body, tends to gain the sympathy
of the jurors.
4. Third party liability suits have come into an age of
their own. In the writer's home state, insurance companies were almost
driven from the state due to the size of judgements which were being
awarded against defendants, namely, industrial firms. This is a problem
common to many states.
a. The size of the judgements range from $100,000 to
one judgement which slightly exceeded one million dollars.
b. In the final evaluation, it is the general public
who pays for these seemingly excessive awards in terms of higher
operating costs for industry.
5. The following is an actual case involving a tnird party
liability suit. It not only illustrates the philosophy underlying
third party claims but also illustrates the weakness of jury trials in
cases of a technical nature. This particular suit also proved to be a
test case as to the legality of contract indemnification clauses
between a contractor and his employer relative to protection to the
employer against third party suits.
In I960, an electric utility company had hired a contractor
for work on a 7,200 volt distribution circuit. During the course of
the contract, one of the employees of the contractor received severe




Shortly after the accident;, a claim was filed against
the utility company by the employee of the contractor in the amount of
$353 s OOO. The basis for the claim was the Common Law Codes (Chapter IV),
ie. , the employer must provide safe tools, equipment, safety rules, etc.
It is worthy to note that during this period, the employee was receiving
state workman's compensation.
As noted in Chapter I, there are three Common Law
defenses which could have been used by the utility company. The pertinent
one in this case was the Law of Contributory Negligence which provides
that an employer (the utility company) is not liable if an injured
worker contributes in any way to his own accident. Therefore, the
utility company's only defense was to prove that the employee had been
negligent at the time of the accident. From the standpoint of a
presentation to a jury, this is not an easy task because in this
particular case, knowledge of back-feeding of a distribution trans-
former, construction standards, safe work methods on 7»200 volt dis-
tribution circuits, the National Electric Safety Code and other tech-
nical data was necessary for an understanding of the case. The ironic
points were that the accident evolved from unsafe work practices which
had been condoned by the workman's foreman, but the point had to be proven
in court. Second, the injured workman had over twenty years experience
in electric line work.
The law firm for the workman capitalized on this point
that the jury would not be familiar with the technical aspects of the
accident and preyed upon their emotions. In the summation of the case,
the top attorney for the workman spent hours itemizing the costs that
47

would be incurred by the workman until the latter' s deatho The
attorney dwelt in minute detail on the pain and suffering. This not
only aroused the sympathy of the jury but also of the injured workman
who was in the courtroom. Finally, the latter broke down and began
sobbing hysterically and was carried from the court room. The defense
attorney called for a mis-trial. After hours of argument, the judge
over-ruled the defense attorney. The damage had been done and nothing
said or done could erase the scene of a man with one leg and arm missing,
being carried from the court room. The workman was awarded $118,000.
There is one other point worthy of note and that is the
Law of Contributory Negligence. Prior to the jury being excused to
determine a verdict, the judge carefully expounded on the law in
terms that any negligence on the part of the workman which may have
contributed to the accident, would constitute a complete defense.
The jury paid little attention to the judge's instructions. The
juries in cases of this nature tend to perceive a corporation as a
financial entity who can well afford to contribute to the economic
loss of a workman. Lack of knowledge of the technical aspects of such
cases, and the preying on the emotional instability of juries tend to
alleviate the possibility of the latter rendering a purely objective
verdict.
The case did not end at this point. When the contractor
was employed by the utility company , he signed a contract and purchased
insurance which was designed to indemnify and protect the utility company
from third party claims. When the claim was levied against the utility
company, the contractor and his insuror refused to stand back of the
indemnification clause of the contract. So after the verdict was
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rendered in favor of the injured workman, which was in this current
year, a suit was filed against the contractor and his insuror in the
amount $145»000. This represented the utility company's loss in terms
of the award, interest, litigation and administrative costs, etc. The
utility company won the case in June 1965. The case was very important,
because it established in the state concerned, the validity of such
indemnification clauses in a contract. The clause had been placed in
the contract because the utility company was aware of the lack of con-
sideration given the Law of Contributory Negligence by juries.
G. Penalities.
1. In nearly every state the failure to furnish the required
insurance is punishable by a fine and, in some cases, by imprisonment.
2. Additionally, in some states, the compensation payments
may be increased, the privilege of doing business may be revoked, or
the company may be liable for suit by the employee with defenses
abrogated.
3. Failure to comply with state safety laws or codes results
in increased compensation payments to the injured worker in, some
states.
VI Results of Workmen's Compensation.
This chapter has treated workmen's compensation from the view-
point of its benefits to injured workers. Perhaps compensation laws'
greatest success has been in motivating employers to reduce accident
hazards and to take steps to insure safe operating practices in their
firms.
The way workemn's compensation has been most effective in motivate
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ing employers toward safety programs , has been in making management
see industrial injuries as a serious drain on profits of their companies,
The identification plus the determination of these costs will be the




DEVELOPMENT OF ACCIDENT COSTS
I Composition of Accident Costs.
A. What happens when an accident occurs?
1. The reply depends on magnitude.
a. In areas of minor injuries, it is the injured person,
his foreman and probably one or two immediate employees who become
concerned.
(l) Even to the layman, costs in terms of the
foreman's time and time lost by the other employees who wish to render
assistance, are evident.
b. In areas of major accidents, all factors are multi-
plied several times. For example, the writer once worked in a metal
shop wnich employed approximately fifty employees. One of the
employees had his hand completely severed by a punch press which
was stamping holes in heavy guage metal.
(1) Within minutes, every employee had stopped work.
(2) Due to no medical facilities, three employees
accompanied the man to the hospital.
What was the cost of the accident? In this case, the costs
would be relatively easy to measure. However, in the following case,
assignment of costs becomes more difficult. This is an example of an
accident which appeared to be very minor initially, but soon evolved
into a case of considerable cost.
Several years ago an electrician was putting nitrogen gas in
a power line transformer (Nitrogen is used to blanket the oil to pre-
vent air and moisturs from entering the space at the top of a transformer
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tank.). He picked up a steel bottle of nitrogen gas weighing about
45-50 pounds and placed it in its mounting on the side of the trans-
former tank. When he lifted, he felt a slight pain in his abdomen for
a moment and then the pain was gone. He continued with his work. Later
during the day, the pain reoccured. A> day or two later, he told the
foreman about the experience. The foreman sent the electrician to a
doctor who found a small abdominal hernia. A minor operation was
performed and the workman returned to work. The doctor reported that
his recovery had been considerably slower and more painful than the
normal case. As is customary in cases of this kind, he was initially
given light work.
'^he case did not end here. A few months later, the same
injury occurred when handling less weight than the first time. The
surgery was repeated again for an abdominal hernia. Recovery was again
painfully slow. He returned to work and was placed on light duty. In
a few months, the injury appeared again in spite of the fact that the
doctor had cautioned him against any lifting.
Finally after the fifth operation and recovery, the man was
placed on a job which would not subject him to any lifting. Today and
several thousand dollars later, he is performing his job successfully
in spite of a 25$ disability rating.
2. It is the purpose of this chapter to present a method
of cost analysis which will depict accident costs as a direct drain
on profits. The discussion will begin with the determination of the
classification of costs.
B. Cost Elements.
1. The two major classes of cost resulting from accidents are,





2. These classifications are not at present the most widely-
used expressions to classify accidents costs. Till 1956, writings had
described costs as "direct" and "indirect," the former meaning the same
as insurance costs and the latter meaning uninsured costs.
3o In 1956, the new classification titles were introduced
and are gradually being adopted by writers and safety organizations,
including the National Safety Council,
4. The traditional concepts of indirsct and direct costs have not
been entirely satisfactory because they are not sufficiently definitive.
a. "Direct costs" have usually referred to definite
outlays of money, eg, compensation payments and medical expense.
b. "Indirect costs" have referred to those which do not
represent definite outlays of money, but which are still reflected in
increased costs of doing business.
c. These distinctions have been difficult to maintain,
hence the reason for accepting the more precise terms "insured" and
"uninsured" costs.
C. Elements of Uninsured Costs.
1. A number of years ago, a utility company line crew was
doing work on a primary distribution circuit, 7,2uO volts to ground, which
had been switched out of serivce. During the period of work, the foreman
instructed a lineman to reclose the disconnect, thereby energizing the
circuit without informing the remainder of the crew.
Two other linemen not knowing the circuit was "hot"





one of the two linemen made a head contact on the primary wire.
He lost consciousness and as he fell (His safety belt was not fastened.),
his body struck across the down guy wire and slid to ground.
Crew members who rushed to his assistance were successful in
reviving him, although he was horribly burned. These resuscitation efforts
had saved the man's life. He was immediately rushed to a hospital many
miles away by fellow employees. Gangrene set in and one leg had to be
amputated at the knee. His scalp was badly burned. He had literally
been scalped electrically. There was bone damage to the skull.
For many months , the open burn on the top of the lineman's
head was treated daily by a nurse coming from a hospital to his home.
The surgeons had to stretch upward the skin on the sides and back of his
head, in order for there to be skin to heal the wound.
Two years after the accident, the open wound on his head
closed. Today, however, cataracts have begun to form on his eyes, prob-
ably as the result of the electric flash at the time of contact. So
this case still is not closed medically after more than ten years .
Costs as of now - many thousands of dollars.
The above represents only one facet of the accident, A
member of management happened to be in the vicinity where the accident
occurred and via car radio learned of the accident. He was on the scene
shortly after the disaster. As might be imagined, crew members were
themselves in a state of shock. They initially refused to return to work
under the direction of the foreman.
A very thorough well documented investigation including
photographs, sworn testimonies
v
checks on prior activities of the fore-
man, etc. was conducted at the Safety Director's level. A formal review
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was conducted by top management. The recommendation was made to dis-
charge the foreman. In this particular case, the final review was
conducted by the President of the company who concurred with the
recommendation.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming humanitarian aspects of
this case, the foreman by one moment of thoughtlessness had placed on
the company a life-time liability.
2. This case has been included to depict the scope and depth
of the following elements of uninsured costs, which may be interpreted
in terms of the above accident case for illustration purposes. In list-
2ing the uninsured costs, only those that are subject to reasonably
accurate measurement are included. Thus effects on employees' morale,
costs to employ new employees, effect on public relations, etc. have been
omitted as not measurable and/or difficult to connect with any one
accident.
3. Cost of Wages paid for time lost by workers who were not
injured .
a. These are employees who stopped work to watch or assist
after the accident, who lost time because of equipment damaged in the
accident, or who lost time because of the lack of production output
by the injured.
b. This element approximates the following percentages
in terms of total uninsured costs:
(1) Lost time cases - 2C$.
(2) Doctor's cases - 9^.






4. The net cost to repair, replace, or straighten up
material or equipment that was damaged in an accident ,
a. Property damage is an obvious costo However,
the one point to watch is to ensure that the charge be confined to
the net cost of repairing or putting in order material or equipment
that has been damaged, or to the current worth of the equipment less
salvage value if damaged beyond repair.
b. In terms of total uninsured costs, this element
approximates the following percentages.
(1) Lost time cases - jfo.
(2) Doctor's cases -- negligible
(5) First-aid cases - negligible
5. Cost of wages paid for working time lost by in.jured
workers, other than workmen's compensation payments .
a. Illustration of such costs are a matter of company
policy, eg, difference between what the employee would normally receive,
and his workmen's compensation benefits.
b. In terms of total uninsured costs, this element
approximates the following percentages.
(1) Lost-time cases - 27$.
(2) Doctors cases - 55$.
(3) First-aid cases - 21$.
6. Extra cost due to overtime work necessitated by an
accident
.
a. This charge is the difference between normal wages
and overtime wages for the time needed to make up lost production, and
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the cost of extra supervision, heat, light, etc.
b. In terms of total uninsured costs, this element
approximates the following percentages.
(1) Lost-time cases - 5$.
(2) Doctors cases - negligible
(3) First-aid cases - negligible
7. Cost of wages paid supervisors while time is required for
activities necessitated by the accident .
a. This charge is based on wages paid the supervisor
for time spent away from normal activities as a result of the accident.
b. In terms of total uninsured costs, this element
approximates 6 percent in each injury class category.
8. Wage cost due to decreased output of injured worker
after return to work .
a. For example, if there is a 40 percent reduction in
the insured's output, the accident should be charged with 40 percent
of his wages.
b. In terms of total uninsured costs, this element
costs around 5 or 6 percent in lost-time and doctors cases, and about
1 percent in first-aid cases.
9. Cost of learning period of new worker .
a. If a replacement worker produces only one-half
as much in the first two weeks as the injured worker would have normally
produced, then half of the new employee's wages should be charged to
the accident. The wage cost for time spent by the supervisor in train-
ing is also a valid charge.
b. This element is negligible in first-aid and doctors
57

cases and around 4 percent in lost-time cases.
10. Uninsured medical cost borne by the company .
a. This cost is usually that of medical services
provided at the plant dispensary, or costs assumed by the company
after maximum insurance payments.
b. In terms of total uninsured costs, this element
approximates the following percentages.
(1) Lost-time cases - 8$.
(2) Doctor's cases - 195$.
(3) First-aid cases - 60$.
11. Cost of time spent by higher supervision and clerical
workers on investigations or in the processing of compensation application
forms.
a. This charge represents time spent by supervision and by
clerical employees in investigating an accident or settling claims.
b. This is not a significant factor in first-aid
cases, but for doctors' cases and lost-time cases, the percentages
are 28 and 17 percent respectively.
12. Miscellaneous unusual costs .
a. Examples are public liability claims, cost of
renting equipment, loss of profit on contracts or orders cancelled,
and demurage.
b. In the study which supports the previously mentioned
percentages, this element was found to be considerably less than 2
percent in each injury class categories.
D. Invalid Elements of Uninsured cost.
If accident cost analysis is to be understood and to
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command the full credence, knowledge of not only valid elements of
costs but also awareness of the invalid charges to an accident, is
necessary. The following elements of cost, which have been suggested
by various writers as typical accident costs, have been eliminated
or very severely qualified on the bases of general invalidity, or valid
only under special circumstances*
1. Cost of hiring new employee.
a. In large firms which continually provide a flow of
new workers, the expense of hiring an employee on account of an accident,
becomes exceedingly difficult to measure.
b. Of course, in small firms the above may not apply
and hence the cost of hiring would be a valid charge.
2. Cost of subsequent injuries that occur in consequence
of the excitement or weakened morale due to the original accident.
a. This would result in the counting of accident costs
twice.
3. Cost due to loss of profit on the injured employee's
productivity, and on idle machines.
a. The following conditions must all be present in
order that there be a "loss of profit" on goods not produced as a
result of accidents.
(1) Accidents must cause a decrease in average
rate of output or a considerable period of time.
(2) The resultant rate of output must be lower
than desirable to maintain in view of product demand and variable costs
3




(3) The resultant output must cause a reduction
in sales.
(4) Sales lost must not be recoverable at a
later date.
4. Overhead cost which continues while the injured employee
is a non-producer.
a. The only logical basis for charging overhead costs
to an accident is if more equipment would be necessary to make up
production lost due to accidents.
II Accident Cost Determination.
As previously noted , there are two kinds of costs forced on
a company by its industrial accidents , the insurance cost and the un-
insured cost, the former being the easier to determine.
A. Insurance Cost.
1. The insurance cost is the cost of workmen's compensation
insurance required by law in each of the fifty states. Most firms carry
this insurance with an insurance company, or with a state-operated fund.
a. For these firms, the insurance cost is the net
amount of the insurance premiums.
b. The word "net" is necessary to reflect refunds in
terms of dividends or rewards for good accident records.
2. Determination of insurance costs become more complicated
for those companies who carry their own workmen's compensation insurance.
a. Some firms carry their own insurance only up to
specified limits and are covered by an underwriter for any amount in




Mr. H. W. Heinrich by his famous 4 to 1 ratio, has been
credited for doing more than any other one person to make industry
conscious of accident-caused production losses. The ratio is still
referred to in many writings and is considered one of the basic
philosophies of accident prevention. However, as Mr. Heinrich admits,
the ratio does not apply to individual firms but to industry as a whole,
and cannot be used as an accurate method of determining indirect (un-
insured) costs for any one particular firm. Hence, the recent develop-
ment of a more accurate method of determining uninsured costs is out-
lined below.
1. The basic principle of this new method is expressed in
4
the following formula.
Total cost = Insurance cost + A (number of lost-time cases) + B
(number of doctors' cases) + C (number of first-aid
cases) + D (number of no-injury accidents).
a. A,B,C, and D are constants indicating the average
uninsured costs for each of the categories.
b. The classification of accidents in the formula are
commonly used by safety engineers. The dividing lines between categories
5
are as lollows:
1. Lost-time cases: (a) permanent partial disabilities and (b)
temporary total disabilities.
2. Doctors' cases: (a) temporary partial disabilities and (b)





Ibid , p. 113.
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3. First-aid cases: medical treatment cases (a) requiring only
first aid and (b) resulting in property damage of less than
$20 and in loss of less than eight hours of working time.
4. No-injury accidents? accidents that (a) either cause no injury
or cause minor injury not requiring the attention of a physician
and (b) result in property damage of $20 or more or in loss of
eight or more man-hours,,
c. Fatalities and permanent total disabilities have been
omitted from the categories since they are unusual and should be subject
to a separate investigation rather than a part of a group whose uninsured
costs are estimated by averages-
2. The average uninsured cost per each category should pre-
ferably be found by a study made in the concern for which costs are to
be computed,
a. However , constants have been developed by R. H. SimondSj
Ph.D., for certain industries.
(l) Use of these constants would probably require
modification since they are based on 1962 wage levels.
3. For firms determining their own average uninsured costs p
Figures I and II are designed to assist in collecting cost data.
a. These cost reports were developed by Dr. Simonds
and have been adopted for use by the National Safety Council.
4. Factors to consider in conducting studies are,,
a. Ensure there is a complete understanding by super-
visors and employees as to purpose of study, ie,
(l) Purpose is to determine average cost for each
category of accident, not to compare foremen and/or departments.
b. Supervisors must be encouraged to report all accidents.
c. Ensure that the study covers sufficient number of cases
Ibid , pp. 127-129.
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so that the constant is representative.
(l) The mathematical, test to help decide how many
cases to investigate is the standard error formula.
d. Ensure that the study covers accidents that are
representative of the firm,,
(l) No conscious effort should be made by supervisors
to select accidents for cost study, while omitting others.
(a) Supervisors might be inclined to omit more
costly cases, thinking them less typical.
(b) Supervisors might be inclined to use only those
cases in which they thought their handling of the matter showed up well.
e. A possibility of bias may exist due to the season at
the time of the study.
(1) For example, some firms conduct work primarily
out of doors.
(2) It may be desirable to break the study into
two parts so as to sample two different seasons.
f. Variations in the level of company operations will
effect items of cost, therefore, the study should be conducted when the
firm is operating under typical conditions as to number of employees and
output.
g. Catastrophe type accidents should be excluded from
the study as not being representational.
(l) It is the accidents that are steadily occurring
whose costs are the object of the study.
Ill Conclusion
It is not of great importance to an organization to know
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precisely, to the dollar, how much of its costs are attributable to
its accidents. It would probably not pay as a permanent practice to
set up and maintain all the accounts necessary to record separately
all the accidents costs. What has been needed is a method of estimating
total accident costs which will provide cost data sufficiently reliable
and accurate to serve as a basis for managerial decisions. This chapter




DEPARTMENT SUPERVISOR'S ACCIDENT COST REPORT
Injury accident
No-injury accident_
Date Name of injured worker
1. How many other workers (not injured) lost time because they were
talking, watching, helping at accident?





2. How many other workers (not injured)lost time because they lacked
equipment damaged in the accident or because they needed the output
or aid of the injured worker?
About how much time did most of them lose?
_____
hours minutes.
3. Describe the damage to material or equipment.
______
Estimate the cost of repair or replacement of above material or
equipment.
__________




5. If operations or machines were made idle; will overtime work probably
be necessary to make up lost production? Yes ( ). No ( ). Will
it be impossible to make up loss of use of machines or equipment?
Yes ( ). No ( ).
Demurrage or other special nonwage costs due to stopping an operation.
6. How much of supervisor's time was used assisting, investigating,









INVESTIGATOR'S COST DATA SHEET
Lost-time
(Permanent partial or temporary
total disability)
Doctor's
(Temporary partial disability or
medical treatment case requiring
outside physician's care)
First-aid









Average hourly wage of workers in department where injury occurred
_____
1. Wage cost of time lost by workers who were not injured, if paid by
employer
.
a) Number of workers who lost time because they were talking, watching,
helping,
.
b) Number of workers who lost time because they lacked equipment
damaged in accident or because they needed output or aid of injured
worker
________•
Average amount of time lost per worker, hours minutes.
2. Nature of damage to material or equipment,
3- Wage cost of time lost by injured worker while being paid by employer
(other than workmen's compensation payments),







b) Number of subsequent days' absence for which worker was paid,
______
days (other than workmen's compensation payments)
_____
hours per day.
c) Number of additional trips for medical attention on employer's
time on succeeding days after worker's return to work
.




4. If lost production was made up by overtime work, how much more did
the work cost than if it had been done in regular hours? (Cost items:
wage rate difference, extra supervision, light, heat, cleaning for
overtime.) $_
5. Cost of supervisor's time required in connection with the accident,
ft . .




b) Additional supervisor's time required later, hours
______
minutes.
6. Wage cost due to decreased output of worker after injury if paid
old rate, $




b) Worker's average percentage of normal output during this period
7. If injured worker was replaced by new worker, wage cost of learning
period, $
m _.
a) Time new worker's output was below normal for his own wage,
days hours per day. His average percentage of normal
output during time, fo. His hourly wage, $
_______






8. Medical cost to company (not covered by workmen's compensation
insurance ) , $
__•
9. Cost of time spent by higher supervision and clerical workers on
investigation, including local processing of workmen's compensation






10. Other costs not covered above (e,g„(, public liability claims;
cost of renting replacement equipment; loss of profit on contracts
canceled or orders lost if accident causes net reduction in
total sales; loss of bonuses by company; cost of hiring new
employee if the additional hiring expense is significant; cost








SAFETY AT THE STATE LEVEL
This syllabus has concentrated a portion of its emphasis on the
state legislation necessary to ensure that the injured worker is ad-
equately reimbursed for his economic loss. It is the intent of this
final chapter to look at what states are doing to lower accident
frequency, as opposed to paying. for accident losses, and to examine
the methods used in legislating and enforcing safety codes.
The following outline is based on information obtained from both
Florida and California relative to their safety organizations and is
believed, based on readings and interviews, to be representative of
the majority of states except where noted.
I The Safety Organization.
A. The safety organization is normally a division of a larger
department. In Florida, the safety division is in the Department of
Industrial Commission.
.
In California, the safety division is in the
Department of Industrial Relations. The functions of such departments
are oriented towards employees' welfare in terms of,
1. Fair Employment Practices.
2. Industrial Safety
3. Labor Law Enforcement.
4. Wages and Working Conditions.
5. Workmen's Compensation.
II Jurisdiction and Authority of the Safety Division.
A. The safety division has power and jurisdiction over every
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place of employment except,
1. Maritime Workers on board ship.
2. Federal Employees.
3. Employees of interstate railroads.
4. Household domestics.
Note that the first three categories also have different types of
workmen's compensation coverage per Chapter IV.
B. The safety division has authority,,
1. To investigate disabling or fatal industrial injuries.
2. To ensure that places of employment are safe for
employees and the public.
3. To prepare safety orders (Depends on authority granted
by each state's legislative body.). For example, under Florida Statute
440.56, the Safety Division of the Florida Industrial Commission has
prepared and now administers a total of 14 mandatory Safety Codes.
In California, the state safety division has prepared and is currently
administering 18 mandatory Safety Codes.
Ill How Industrial Safety Orders are Developed.
A. There are two methods of creating safety orders,
1. Codes formulated by legislative action, which are
actually laws.
2. Codes established by the state's safety division, which
in a legal sense are not laws but have the effect and force of law.
a. As may be deduced, the process of legislating codes
via legislative bodies proves to be a cumbersome and unwieldy process
from the viewpoint of administration, enforcement, and constant
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changes required to keep pace with technological progress.
b. In most states „ authority has been granted to the
safety division to formulate safety codes.
B. The need for safety orders is determined by either noting
increases in accident frequency and severity rates of similar types
of employment or by noting excessive compensation payments for accidents
of a similar nature.
1. Some states have a labor statistics division which , among
other functions, maintains data by type of accident and industry for use
of the safety division.
C. The steps generally followed in those states where codes are
established by the safety division are as follows.
1. The first draft is written by staff engineers. Assistance
is obtained from many sources , eg.,
a. Experts from the particular industry concerned.
b. Safety codes of other states.
c. National Safety Council.
d. Underwriters Laboratories.
e. National Bureau of Standards.
f. Various agencies of the Federal Government.
2. The second major step is public hearings at which time
comments and/or criticisms of management and labor are heard.
a. Comments are studied and reviewed and those consider-
ed of merit are incorporated into a revised draft of the proposed safety
order.
3. The final step is the submission of the proposed code
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to the state Industrial Safety Boards, who by majority vote, will
either approve or disapprove the proposal.
a. In California, after action by the Board, anyone
may within twenty days formally petition for a rehearing. If the
petition is granted, another public hearing is held. If no petition
is filed within twenty days, the Board files the safety order with
the Secretary of State, thirty days after which the order becomes
automatically effective.
IV Enforcement
A. Codes written by a state safety division have the same force
and effect as those safe practice procedures established by a state
legislative body.
B. The two alternatives available to a state for enforcement
of safety codes ares
1. Enforcement via law enforcement agencies.
2. Enforcement via field safety representatives.
a. As may be correctly deduced, utilization of properly
qualified safety engineers is far superior to using regular law enforce-
ment agencies if for no other reason than the requirement for technically
qualified specialists. A brief examination of some of California's
safety orders will make this point clear.
(1) Aerial Passanger Tramway Safety Orders.
(2) Boiler and Fired Pressure Vessel Safety Orders.
(3) Electrical Safety Orders.
(4) Logging and Sawmill Safety Orders.
(5) Pneumatic Explosives Loading Safety Orders.
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(6) Quarry and Open Pit Mine Safety Orders.
C The actual authority of the field safety representatives
extends from the mere notification of an unsafe working condition
which is corrected Dy the employer, to the authority to close a firm,
and if need be prosecute the employer.
1. Based on California statistics, the Division of Industrial
Safety each year,
a. Requires the elimination of about 180,000 unsafe
working conditions,
b. Closes approximately 450 firms (pending compliance).
c. And initiates about 25 prosecutions.
D. To permit expeditious prosecution of safety code violators,
the Florida State Legislature in 1963 enacted a law entitled "Expeditious,
Compliance" which permits field safety representatives to bring
violators into a hearing within a matter of hours (instead of weeks).
1. Many of the violators are assessed fines ($100.00 per
day per violation) which in the writer's opinion are insignificant
relative to the financial condition of some industries or contractors.
V Safety and Politics.
In 1958 the Florida Industrial Commission-Safety Division assisted
by its Safety Advisory Engineering and Safety Code Committees created
the "Crane Code", It was finally adopted by public hearing in spite
of strong objection by a certain contracting group. Its use, supple-
mented by a continuing educational program has gradually become more
and more effective, in spite of the fact that the use of cranes and




and draglines had grown tremendously.
The above is cited only to illustrate that special interest
groups have and will continue to employ lobbying forces in an effort
to acquire gains under the guise of safety for certain selfish
interests. At certain locations, there have been codes already
adopted and legislation passed which increases rather than decreases
accident frequency. Safety and politics do not mix. It behooves
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